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I. Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission
A. Summary
In 1979, the Montana Legislature began a general
adjudication of all water rights in the state
through passage of Senate Bill 76. That
legislation repealed parts of the 1973 Water Use
Act, mandated that claims for all water rights be
filed within a specified time limit, 	 and
established a water court system to adjudicate all
water rights. While the legislation was under
consideration, seven federal suits were filed in
federal district courts in Montana, seeking
adjudication of tribal and federal reserved rights
in that forum.
After unified opposition to the legislation from
the federal agencies and the tribes, the
Legislature suspended the filing requirement for
reserved water rights and provided an opportunity
for those rights to be established through
negotiations instead of through litigation. It
established the Montana Reserved Water Rights
Compact Commission solely for the purpose of
conducting those negotiations on behalf of the
state.
In 1985, the Commission successfully concluded a
compact with the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of
the Fort Peck Reservation. That compact was
ratified by the Legislature and the Tribal Council
in April and became state law when it was signed
by the Governor on May 15, 1985. Pursuant to the
terms of the compact, the tribe adopted a tribal
water code which, in 1986, became the first tribal
water code to be approved by the federal
government.
Thus, over a period of approximately five years,
the reserved water rights for the second largest
of the seven Indian reservations in the state were
quantified without resort to litigation. 	 In
addition, the parties institutionalized
communications between the governments, created a
structure to resolve disputes over water uses, and
established a process for cooperative management
and joint leasing of shared water resources.
In the past, relationships between the state and
tribal governments and between the tribal and
non-tribal citizens of Montana have varied from
indifference to mutual distrust to outright
hostility. Resolution of disagreements or
differences between the governments or between
tribal and non-tribal citizens was most often
referred to Congress or deferred to the courts.
Because watersheds do not honor political
boundaries, competing water uses and competing
jurisdiction over water planning and water
development created long-term controversies
between the respective governments. The Fort
Peck-Montana Compact is a significant departure
from that past.
The benefits of the Compact for the State and the
Fort Peck Tribes in the areas of water management
and water planning are obvious. Not as obvious,
but perhaps of greater significance, are the
benefits from improved relationships between the
state and tribal governments. Through recognition
of tribal sovereignty, through quantification of
tribal water rights by negotiations, and through
agreement on institutions and policies that
require continuing working relationships, the
state of Montana has initiated a new era of




The Fort Peck-Montana Compact, 1985,
Montana Laws, Ch. 735.
Senate Bill 76, 1979, Montana Laws, Ch.
697.
The Montana Water Use Act, 1973, Montana
Laws, Ch. 452.
2. Tribal Enactments
Tribal Water Code, Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes, Fort Peck Indian Reservation,
Resolution No. 993-86-5, May 15, 1986,
amended by Resolutions No. 1552-86-9,
1553-86-9, and 1554-86-9, September 22,
1986.
En'
3. Reports and Other Materials
Horsman, A.L., A Selective Review of Water
Use and Related Issues on the Blackfeet
Indian Reservation, 1873-1946 (1975).
Horsman, A.L., A Selective Review of Water
Use and Related Issues on the Fort Peck
Indian Reservation, 1878-1946 (1975).
Hundley,	 Jr.,	 Norris,	 The	 "Winters"
Decision and Indian Water Rights: A
Mystery Reexamined, Western Historical 
Quarterly, Jan. 1982, pp. 17-42.
4. Cases
Assiniboine and Gros Ventre Tribes v. 
U.S., No. CV 85-213-GF (1985).
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. 
Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 1982, cert. denied,
102 S.Ct. 1612 (1982).
P-'	 Conrad Investment Co. v. U.S., 161 F. 829
(9th Cir. 1908).
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 105
S.Ct. 2399 (1985).
Montana v. Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d 895 (9th
Cir. 1987; aff'd., 108 S.Ct. 685 (1988).
Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Territory of Montana v. Drennan, 1 Mont.
41 (1868).
Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
C. Historical Background
In Montana, as throughout the West, two methods of
resolving water rights disputes have traditionally
been pursued:	 the self-help method and the
litigation method. For example, in 1868, Michael
Drennan of Deer Lodge County, Montana Territory,
enlisted the first method when his neighbor, one
Patrick Dalton, diverted water from Washington
Gulch and thereby deprived Michael of the water
that he had been using to work his mining claim.
Employment of the self-help method in this first
recorded water rights dispute in Montana resulted
in an indictment for assault with a deadly weapon
and the first "Pat and Mike" story in the
Territory of Montana. (Territory of Montana v. 
Drennan, 1 Mont. 41 (1868).)
Irish miners were not the only ones to consider
the self-help option. Birch Creek is a small
stream that forms the southern boundary of the
Blackfeet Reservation in Montana. Early in the
1900's, when non-Indians diverted virtually all of
the flow of Birch Creek for farming operations,
the federal agent, Mr. Monteath, requested
permission to use gun powder to blast out the
diversion dam and release water for use by the
Blackfeet Indians.	 (Notice, Indian Agent to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 30,
1904.)	 Permission was denied.	 The self-help
method was rejected in favor of the litigation
method. The subsequent case, Conrad Investment 
Co. v. U.S., 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908), resulted
in an injunction against the company in favor of
the Blackfeet Tribe.
However, what these two cases illustrate is that
neither the self-help method nor the litigation
method secured very satisfactory results. In the
case of Pat and Mike, Pat was wounded and Mike
presumably was jailed after the court found that
the shooting was not a defensible act under the
circumstances. In the other case, although the
injunction was issued in favor of the Blackfeet
Indians, the annual report written for the
Blackfeet Agency three years later noted that the
Conrad Investment Company was still taking almost
all of the flow of Birch Creek for its own use.
(Annual Report, Blackfeet Agency to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1911.)
Finally, perhaps the best evidence coming out of
the state of Montana that litigation does not
necessarily provide either the certainty or the
finality that is generally cited as the goal of
litigation is the case within which the United
States Supreme Court first articulated the
reserved water rights doctrine: Winters v. U.S.,
207 U.S. 564 (1908). In the Winters decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized the existence of
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reserved water rights for the Assiniboine & Gros
Ventre Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation in
Montana.
However, although the Court decreed a specific
amount of water, to the Fort Belknap Tribes,
disputes have continued over the implications of
the decree and the amount of water available for
the reservation from the Milk River. Since the
first district court injunction in 1906, Indian
Agents have consistently protested that upstream
diversions continue to impact the Tribes' water
rights. The controversy returned to federal
district court during the 1985 drought. The suit
was dismissed after the Tribes and the Bureau of
Reclamation reached an interim agreement that
provided additional stored water for the Fort
Belknap Reservation.	 (Assiniboine and  Gros Ventre
Tribes v. U.S., No. CV 85-213-GF, 1985).
Yet, during the following irrigation season the
Bureau of Indian Affairs published a notice
advising all persons taking water upstream on the
Milk River or from the tributaries that illegal
diversions would be referred to the Department of
Justice for prosecution. (Public Notice, Great
Falls Tribune, May 27, 1987). Thus, eighty years
after the Winters decision, significant legal and
technical issues concerning the reserved rights
for the Fort Belknap Reservation are still not
resolved.
In 1979, the state of Montana chose to adopt a
radically different approach when it created the
Compact Commission and mandated that the federal
reserved water rights within the state be resolved
through a process of negotiations rather than
through litigation.
D. Legal and Factual Context
Montana state law recognizes a wide variety of
beneficial uses for the waters of the state,
including "agricultural, stockwater, domestic,
fish and wildlife, industrial, irrigation, mining,
municipal,	 power	 and	 recreation	 uses."
( 85-2-102(2)(a) Mont. Code Ann. 1987). The scope
of the state water rights held by thousands of
individuals and private and public entities for
these purposes will be established by adjudication
in the state water courts.
r
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Roughly 850,000 people live on the nearly 93
million acres of land that constitute the state of
Montana. State citizens have filed over 200,000
claims to water rights in eighty-five water
adjudication basins. However, the security of the
state rights will not be known definitely until
the scope of the reserved rights is determined by
the negotiations. Any users contemplating a
substantial investment in a water system must
first consider whether and to what extent federal
reserved rights may preclude them from securing
the water they need to operate the system.
There are federal reserved water rights in all but
eleven of the water adjudication basins. Four
federal agencies that manage 29 million acres of
lands in Montana are currently in negotiations
with the Compact Commission. The United States
Fish and Wildlife Service claims reserved water
rights for five of the dozens of national wildlife
refuges within the state. The National Park
Service claims water rights for Yellowstone
National Park, Glacier National Park, and three
smaller units of the National Park System. The
National Forest Service claims rights for 17
million acres of land and the Wild and Scenic
Flathead River system. Finally, the Bureau of
Land Management claims reserved rights for the
Wild and Scenic Missouri River.
The following Indian tribes live within the state
of Montana on seven reservations established by
treaty and by Congress:	 the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes;	 the Crow Indians;	 the
Northern Cheyenne Indians;	 the Assiniboine and
Sioux Tribes;	 the Blackfeet Indians;	 the
Chippewa Cree Indians;	 and the Assiniboine and
Gros Ventre Tribes. In 1983, 46,136 members were
enrolled in these tribes; the combined acreage of
the seven reservations is over 8.2 million acres.
Quantification of the federal water rights held by
four federal agencies and seven Indian
reservations not only will provide possibilities
of new water development for the tribes and




1979 The Compact Commission was created by the
Montana State Legislature and the original
nine members were appointed.
1980	 Tribes and federal agencies were invited
to	 negotiate;	 the	 first	 tribal
governments established negotiating teams.
1985 Negotiations concluded with the
Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort
Peck Reservation and the resulting Compact
was ratified by the Legislature and the
Tribal Council.
1987	 The first three members were appointed to
the Fort Peck-Montana Compact Board.
1987 The Montana Legislature extended the
authority of the Compact Commission for an
additional six years, to 1993.
1987 The Montana Legislature directed the
Commission to concentrate its efforts, to
the extent practicable, on resolving
disputes in the Milk River basin, where
water shortages have resulted in chronic
water management problems.
II	 Administration of Negotiations
A. Commission Membership
The Compact Commission is composed of nine
permanent members. Four are members of the state
legislature, four are appointed by the Governor,
and one is appointed by the Attorney General of
Montana. The Commission members are solely
responsible for the policy adopted by the
Commission, subject to the Legislature's
prerogative to reject or ratify a proposed
compact.
The compact alternative was developed by a joint
subcommittee of the legislature that included
prominent legislators who were particularly
experienced in water issues. Four of the members
of that subcommittee were subsequently named to
the Commission, including Senator Jack Galt, the
current chair of the Commission, and
Representatives Audrey Roth, Daniel Kemmis, and
William Day, who each served for several years
before resigning. The success of the negotiations
depends largely on the commitment, knowledge and
skills of the members of the Commission and on the
leadership exercised by the chairmen and
vice-chairmen.
Henry Loble was elected as chair in 1979 by the
members of the Commission and served in that
capacity for the first four years after the
Commission was established. Under his leadership,
the Commission established communications with all
the tribes and federal agencies and was successful
at bringing all but one of the tribes and agencies
into the process. A compact was negotiated to the
final stages with the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes
of the Fort Peck Reservation. In 1983, Mr. Loble
resigned from the Commission and was elected state
district court judge.
W. Gordon McOmber, now lieutenant governor of the
state of Montana, served as the second chair of
the Commission from 1983 through 1986. Under Mr.
McOmber's leadership, the Commission established
management policies and structured the Commission
to make more efficient use of the time, skills and
experience of the Commission members. During his
tenure, the Fort Peck-Montana Compact was
successfully negotiated and ratified. Mr. McOmber
resigned as chair in 1986 but continues as a
member of the Commission.
Current chair, Senator Jack Galt, a Martinsdale
rancher, is one of two original members of the
Commission still serving. He was elected
vice-chair in 1979 and served in that capacity
until his election as chair in 1985. Senator Galt
is the Republican National Committeeman from
Montana. He is the chairman of the Water Policy
Committee of the Montana Legislature. He also
serves on the State Water Plan Advisory Committee
and is the Montana representative on the Water
Policy Committee of the Western Legislative
Conference.
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Assistant Attorney General Chris Tweeten is the
current vice-chair of the Commission. Prior to
his appointment to the Commission by the Attorney
General, he served as head of the Indian
Jurisdiction Project in the Attorney General's
office and, in that capacity, as advisor to the
Commission.
Senator Joe Mazurek, Helena attorney, has served
in the Montana Senate since 1981 and currently
chairs the Judiciary Committee. Representative
Gary Spaeth, Red Lodge attorney, has served three
terms in the Montana House of Representatives and
is currently on the Water Policy Committee of the
Legislature.	 Representative Dennis Iverson,
rancher from Whitlash, has served in the Montana
House since 1979.	 He served as chairman of the
Environmental Quality Council of the Legislature
for six years.	 He is currently a member of the
Water Policy Committee of the Legislature.
Everett Elliott, the other original member still
serving on the Commission, is a former Pondera
County Commissioner. Carl Davis, Dillon attorney,
is a former Beaverhead County Attorney and served
as a delegate to the Montana Constitutional
Convention in 1972. Gene Etchart, Vandalia
rancher, is a former president of the Montana
Stockgrowers' Association and served as a member
of the advisory council to the Public Land Law
Review Commission. He has received the Department
of the Interior's Conservation Service Award.
B. Relationship to Other State Agencies
Pursuant to a Memo of Understanding, the
Governor's Office, the Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation, and the Attorney
General's Office are consulted on proposals,
technical issues and legal strategies. By
statute, the Commission is attached to the
Governor's Office for administrative purposes.
The budget for the Commission is administered
within the budget of the Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation.
C. Commission Structure
Because the nine members are prominent citizens
with other full-time responsibilities, 	 the
Commission is structured to utilize their time as
efficiently as possible. The Commission is
divided into negotiating teams for each federal
and tribal entity, with four or five members on
each team. Each Commission member serves as chair
of at least one negotiating team, and as
vice-chair of at least one other team. Each
member serves on two tribal teams and on at least
one federal team.
The negotiating teams are responsible for
reviewing staff technical work, developing
recommendations for the Commission, and meeting
with the tribes or agencies. Commission members
participate directly in the negotiating sessions
and in formal and informal meetings with the
federal and tribal entities. 	 Commission members
also participate in public hearings, in
presentations before legislative committees, and
in meetings with interested organizations. Policy
decisions are made by the Commission at regularly
scheduled meetings, based on recommendations of
the Commission's negotiating teams and on
technical information developed by the staff.
D. Commission Staff
The Commission is served by a technical staff of
six, including an attorney/program manager, an
agricultural engineer, a hydrologist, a remote
sensing specialist, a research specialist, and a
secretary. Technical information developed by the
staff	 includes	 legal	 analysis,	 historical
research,	 hydrologic	 and	 geographic
investigations, engineering feasibility and
design, analysis of aerial photography, and
processing of satellite images and other digitized
information.
E. Commission Budget
The current operating budget of the Commission for
each fiscal year of the 1988-89 biennium is
$229,767. Almost three-quarters of the budget is
devoted to personnel costs. Non-personnel
expenditures include equipment purchases, data
acquisition, communication expenses and travel for
Commission members and staff.
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The annual budget of the Commission is
appropriated by the state legislature from state
general funds and state resource indemnity trust
funds. No federal, local or private funds are
used for the activities of the Commission.
III. The Fort Peck-Montana Compact
A. Summary
Following four years of sporadic negotiations and
five final months of intense discussions, the
State and the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the
Fort Peck Reservation reached agreement on the
provisions of the Fort Peck-Montana Compact. The
compact was ratified by the Legislature and the
Tribal Council in April. The compact was signed
by the Governor on May 15, 1985. Pursuant to the
terms of the compact, the tribe adopted a tribal
water code which, in 1986, became the first tribal
water code to be approved by the federal
government. The implementation of the compact has
been highly successful to date.
B. Quantification
The compact established that the Fort Peck Tribes
have the right to divert 1,050,472 acre-feet of
water each year or to consume 525,236 acre-feet of
water per year. Of this amount, no more than
950,000 acre-feet per year may be diverted or
475,000 acre-feet per year may be consumed from
surface water. The compact specifies that the
Tribes may satisfy part of the reserved water
right from groundwater. The priority date of the
Tribal Water Right was established as May 1, 1888,
the date of the reservation of specific lands for
the Fort Peck Tribes.
The compact established who may use the Tribal
Water Right and that all uses would be pursuant to
a tribal code approved by the Tribal Council and
the Department of the Interior. All uses of water
by the Tribes, Indians on the Reservation,
non-Indian successors-in-interest to Indian
allottees on the reservation, persons within the
Fort Peck Irrigation Project, and persons
authorized by the Tribes to use water by a
transfer or by a water marketing agreement are
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counted as uses of the Tribal Water Right. The
aggregate of all of these uses may not exceed the
amount of water recognized as a Tribal Water
Right.
The compact provides that the Tribal Water Right
may be used on the reservation without regard to
whether the purpose for which it is used is
recognized as a beneficial use under Montana law.
However, no uses of the Tribal Water Right may be
wasteful.
The Tribal Water Right may be used off the
reservation, under procedural conditions and
substantive criteria agreed upon in the compact.
Off the reservation, all uses of the Tribal Water
Right must be beneficial uses as defined by valid
Montana law at the time of any proposed use.
Further, all persons using the Tribal Water Right,
including the Tribes, must comply with state law
regulating the construction or operation of
facilities using or transporting water off the
reservation. Each use of the Tribal Water Right
must also comply with all provisions of state law
regulating transportation of water outside the
state.
Sources of water from which the Tribal Water Right
may be used are specified in the compact. A
diversion schedule was established for water uses
from the mainstem of the Missouri River, including
Fort Peck Reservoir. The schedule of monthly
diversions was developed by the Tribes, the State,
and the Army Corps of Engineers to assure minimum
impacts on the historical operating regime of the
mainstem Missouri dams and yet provide flexibility
to the Tribes.
C. Protection of Existing Uses
Existing uses of water by Indians on the
reservation and future domestic uses of water and
stockwater ponds up to 20 acre-feet are protected
with a priority date of 1888. Future uses of the
Tribal Water Right are subordinated to existing
non-Indian uses of water on the reservation and to
all future domestic uses of water by non-Indians
and stockwater ponds up to 20 acre-feet.
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Changes in existing non-Indian uses will be
allowed pursuant to the state administrative
review procedures, provided that any change must
satisfy all requirements of state law and three
special provisions of the compact that protect the
Tribal Water Right.
D. Marketing
The compact authorizes the Tribes to market water
off the reservation and to market jointly with the
State. The parties agreed to petition Congress to
enact explicit marketing authority for the
Tribes. As long as the State markets jointly with
the Tribes, any proposed marketing opportunity
will meet the provisions of Montana law in effect
at the time of the proposed transfer. If the
State declines to market with the Tribes, the
proposed transfer will be subject to the terms of
the compact.
The Tribes may also enter into leasing
arrangements with water users on the streams that
flow through or adjacent to the reservation.
While all existing water users are protected, a
future appropriator of water under state law may
wish to enter into such an agreement with the
Tribes rather than take a chance that the Tribes
may exercise the Tribal Water Right on those water
sources and preempt his use.
The compact established a limit on the amount of
water the Tribes may transfer off the reservation
equal to the limit on the State's authority to
lease water under state law. As the statutory
limit on the State's authority increases, the
amount that the Tribes can market also increases.
If the State's statutory authority is repealed,
the Tribes would be subject either to limitations
established in federal law or to limitations in
state law that would apply to any state
appropriative right.
E. Instream Flows
Within the five years after ratification of the
compact, the Tribes may establish instream flows
to maintain fish and wildlife resources in the
streams that flow on or adjacent to the
reservation.	 The instream flows will be counted
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as a consumptive use of the Tribal Water Right and
cannot be changed without the agreement of the
State.
F. Administration
The administration of water rights on the
reservation is divided among the United States,
the Fort Peck Tribes and the State. The United
States will continue to administer the water
diverted for use by the Fort Peck Irrigation
Project.
The compact provided that the Tribes will
administer and enforce all uses of the Tribal
Water Right in accordance with a water code to be
adopted within a year after ratification of the
compact. The Tribes agreed to report existing
uses of the Tribal Water Right to the State within
six months after approval of the code.
Thereafter, the compact provided that the Tribes
will send quarterly notices to the State as new
uses of the Tribal Water Right are permitted by
the Tribes.
The State will continue to administer and enforce
all state appropriative rights on the reservation,
and agreed to report all existing and future
appropriative rights to the Tribes on a quarterly
basis.
Neither the Tribes nor the State will authorize
uses of groundwater on the reservation if those
uses will significantly degrade the quality of
water established for instream flows or degrade
the quality of or permanently deplete the quantity
of an aquifer beneath the reservation.
G. Dispute Resolution
The compact established the Fort Peck-Montana
Compact Board to resolve disputes between users of
the Tribal Water Right and users of state
appropriative rights. The compact specified that
the board will consist of one representative from
the Tribes, one representative from the State, and
one neutral member chosen by the other two. The
powers of the board were specified in the
compact. Decisions of the board are appealable
and may be enforced by a federal or state court,
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or by a tribal court, if all parties to the
dispute agree to the jurisdiction of the tribal
court.
IV. Implementation of the Compact
A. Adoption of Tribal Water Code
The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck
Indian Reservation, through the Tribal Executive
Board, enacted the Fort Peck Tribal Water Code by
resolution on May 15, 1986. The initial provision
of the code states that the purposes of the
enactment are
Cl) to provide for the orderly
resolution of disputes between
persons authorized to use the
Tribal Water Right, (2) to
regulate and administer all
diversions and uses of water
under the Tribal Water Right
within the Reservation except
for diversions or uses received
from the Fort Peck Irrigation
Project, and (3) to implement
the Fort Peck-Montana Compact.
Chapter 1, Section 101, Fort Peck Tribal Water
Code, Resolution No. 993-86-5, 1986.
The code established a Water Resources Control
Commission and authorized it to adopt rules and
regulations as necessary to implement the
objectives and purposes of the code. All rules or
regulations proposed by the Commission are
submitted to the Tribal Executive Board for
approval.
The code also established the position of Water
Administrator which is responsible for the
enforcement and administration of the policies and
water permits issued pursuant to the code. The
Administrator is responsible for implementation of
the permit process established in the code, for
collection of water resources data necessary to
accomplish the objectives of the code, for
investigation of water uses affecting the water
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sources on the reservation, and making
recommendations to the Water Resources Control
Commission concerning management of water during
shortages.
The code specified procedures under which new uses
of the Tribal Water Right will be permitted by the
Tribes and procedures under which transfers of the
Tribal Water Right will be allowed. The code also
provided for hearings and appeals of decisions of
the Water Resources Control Commission.
B. Reciprocal Reporting
Since the adoption of the Tribal Water Code, the
Tribes have been conducting an inventory of the
existing uses of the Tribal Water Right. When
that inventory is completed, those uses and all
new uses for which permits have been issued under
the code will be reported to the State.
On March 10, 1986, the State submitted the initial
report of state permits that had been issued to
water users on the water sources specified in the
compact. Subsequent reports have been submitted
on a quarterly basis as agreed upon in the
compact.
C. Fort Peck-Montana Compact Board
Shortly after the ratification of the compact, the
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes appointed Tom Stetson
as the tribal representative on the Fort
Peck-Montana Compact Board. Mr. Stetson of
Stetson Engineering, Inc. represented the Tribes
as technical advisor during the negotiations.
At approximately the same time, Governor Ted
Schwinden appointed Larry Fasbender as the state
representative on the Board. Mr. Fasbender, a
former legislator and former member of the Compact
Commission, is the director of the Montana
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation.
In July of 1987, Mr. Stetson and Mr. Fasbender
chose Margery Hunter Brown as the third member of
the Board. Ms. Brown is the chair of the Montana
Human Rights Commission, a professor of law at the
University of Montana School of Law, and director
of the Indian Law Clinic at the University.
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The initial meeting of the Board was held on
November 6, 1987. The Board is in the process of
establishing rules and procedures. Funds have
been appropriated by the State and the Tribes to
support the activities of the Board.
D. Integration into the Adjudication
State law specifies that compacts ratified by the
Legislature will be entered into preliminary
decrees. Preliminary decrees are then to be
opened for objection by other parties to the
decree.	 The Fort Peck-Montana Compact has been
filed in state water court in the appropriate
water adjudication basins. Preliminary decrees
have not yet been issued in any of the affected
basins. After those decrees are issued, the water
court will set hearings on any objections that are
filed. If any objections to the compact are filed
and are sustained by the court, the compact may be
voided by the water court, but it may not be
modified except with the written consent of the
Tribes and the State.
/-`	 E. Congressional Approval of Marketing
The compact specified language that would be
submitted to Congress by the State and the Tribes
to explicitly authorize the Fort Peck Tribes to
market water. The language has since been
modified in response to questions from Senator
John Melcher of Montana. The parties will
continue to seek Congressional approval of this
provision of the compact.
V. Negotiations Overview
A. Benefits and Costs of Negotiations
The objective of the Compact Commission is to
conclude compacts with tribal governments and
federal agencies to establish by agreement the
specific quantity of water that each entity is
entitled to utilize for the primary purposes for
which the Indian or federal lands were reserved.
The primary benefit of this alternative form of
resolution of reserved water rights is the
avoidance of the financial, political, and social
costs of protracted litigation.
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Litigation of complex federal reserved water
rights disputes simply costs more than can be
justified under the circumstances that exist in
the state of Montana. Significant costs are
incurred in the development of information for
litigation. The technical evidence for federal
reserved water rights litigation is site specific
and requires detailed scientific study and
engineering analysis. Negotiations offer the
parties the opportunity to agree as to what amount
of information they will each accept as a
sufficient basis for agreement on the technical
issues and as to methods by which the information
will be acquired.
Because of the importance of these issues to the
tribes, the federal agencies, and the states, and
because of the complexity of the federal issues
involved, litigation over reserved water rights is
rarely concluded until appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Multiple appeals through
the state and federal court systems consume a
great deal of time and require a significant
investment of revenues, something neither the
Tribes, the federal government, nor the state of
Montana have in abundance at this time.
Moreover, a listing of the financial costs of
litigation does not begin to identify all the
costs to the citizens of the state. The state and
the tribal governments in Montana have recent
experience with protracted litigation, not on
water rights issues but on other matters,
including regulation of hunting and fishing on the
Crow Reservation (Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544,
1981), regulation of lakeshore development on the
Flathead Reservation (Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 1982,
cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1612, 1982), tax revenues
associated with oil development on the Blackfeet
Reservation (Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 105 S.Ct.
2399, 1985), and tax revenues associated with coal
development on the Crow Reservation (Montana v.
Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987;	 aff'd,
108 S.Ct. 685 (1988). Current relationships
between the State and the Blackfeet Tribe, the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, and the
Crow Tribe are not especially harmonious.
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In contrast, the negotiated resolution of the
reserved water rights of the Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation was concluded
in less than five years and cost the Montana less
than $1 million in state revenues. Equally
important, the Tribes and the State have
established mechanisms through which they are
beginning to resolve together the water allocation
and management issues that affect their respective
jurisdictions.
In the most basic terms, cooperative management of
water resources on the Fort Peck Reservation means
that tribal and state administrators talk to each
other about- common problems and search for
practical solutions to the problems at the
appropriate level within the bureaucracies.
Sometimes that means that the Tribal Water
Administrator consults with the local field office
of the Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation. Sometimes it means that the tribal
attorney consults with state attorneys. Other
times it means that when the Tribal Chairman is in
Helena he visits with the Director of the
Department of Natural Resources or with the
Governor. All of these events have become routine
since the ratification of the Fort Peck-Montana
Compact.
Besides development of working relationships, the
State and the Fort Peck Tribes created an
opportunity for shared development of the water
resource through provisions for joint marketing.
Opportunities may exist for sharing the economic
benefits of water development on other
reservations as well. For example, state and
federal agencies and tribal governments are
currently evaluating proposals for rehabilitation
of the Milk River Irrigation Project that, if
completed, will benefit tribal and non-tribal
water users alike.
Both tribal and non-tribal citizens have economic
interests in maximization of the beneficial use of
water in the state. Roughly 95% of the water used
consumptively within the state of Montana is used
by irrigated agriculture. To a significant
degree, therefore, the health of the economy of
the state depends on the continued certainty of
water for agricultural uses both on and off the
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reservations. Moreover, unemployment on the seven
Indian reservations in Montana ranges from 33% to
70%. To the extent that negotiated settlements of
tribal water rights include present or future
water development or marketing agreements,
compacts can bring very tangible economic benefits
to the reservations and to the State as a whole.
B. Obstacles to Negotiated Settlements
The most significant obstacle, one which can be
expected to remain in varying degrees, is the
legacy of decades of conflict between tribal and
non-tribal interests in Montana.	 Ongoing
conflicts over taxation, land ownership,
environmental regulation, law enforcement, water
rights and water uses all contribute to the
skepticism of many about the negotiations
process. The result is that the state and tribal
representatives to the negotiations, as well as
observers and advisors, remain cautious about
making and accepting commitments.
While all the state and federal agencies with
direct involvement in the negotiations officially
support the process, some individuals remain
skeptical that the Commission can resolve the
complex legal issues that are involved through
negotiations. Some individuals also worry that
the federal agencies and tribes have superior
financial resources and are developing a superior
technical information base that the state cannot
duplicate with current expenditures.
Not only does the past create obstacles to
negotiations--so does the future. The fact that
neither the tribes nor the State can be totally
certain how much water will be needed in the
future or the uses for which it will be needed
causes considerable caution. The uncertainty of
the future and the permanent nature of these
settlements generate strong motivations to protect
all possible options. It is not surprising if
participants sometimes want to delay decisions,
because these issues are very important and the
future costs of bad decisions may be great.
Therefore, compacts will be successfully concluded
only when a negotiated settlement can be
structured to serve critical interests of each
participating government.
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The unique nature of the commission negotiation
process has itself presented significant
challenges. In 1983, a proposed compact was
rejected by the Commission after objections were
raised by other state agencies and it became
questionable whether legislative ratification of
the compact could be secured. This obstacle
resulted from a lack of clarity about the
relationship between the Commission and the other
state agencies, lack of a formal agreement about
the roles that each entity would play in the
negotiations, and lack of an accepted method of
communications among the state entities. A Memo
of Understanding executed in 1984 established
agreement on the procedures for state agency
participation and consultation and clarified the
relationships between those agencies and the
Commission. From the perspective of the
Commission, this obstacle has been removed;
however, some federal participants continue to
express concern about the issue.
Again, from the perspective of the state, this
obstacle exists to a much greater degree within
the federal bureaucracy because of the conflicting
responsibilities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
the Bureau of Reclamation, the Office of
Management and Budget, the land management
agencies and the Department of Justice. Perhaps
it is unavoidable that, when people negotiate on
behalf of bureaucracies, it is difficult for the
participants to have confidence that the other
bureaucracy is committed to the process or that
the other negotiators have the legal authority and
the political ability to assure commitment on a
given issue.
A related obstacle, one that is exacerbated
because of the deliberate pace of negotiations on
these issues, is the lack of continuity on the
Commission, on the tribal councils, and within the
federal and state bureaucracies. With each new
administration, the personnel, and to some extent,
the policies change for some of the negotiating
entities. The intent of the statutory provision
that the Compact Commission members serve for
life, unless they resign, was to provide maximum
continuity on the Commission. However, the
reality is that after eight years only two of the
original nine members are still active on the
Commission.
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A final obstacle for negotiations conducted within
the context of the state-wide general stream
adjudication is the difficulty of concluding
compacts within a relatively short time-frame,
because of the number of negotiating entities and
the limited staff resources available. The recent
mandate of the legislature that the adjudication
focus on the Milk River basin has been helpful by
reducing the number of entities with whom the
Commission is actively negotiating. In addition,
the organization of the Commission into
negotiating teams has facilitated more efficient
use of the time and energy of the Commission
members.
Because the members of the Commission are citizens
with other full-time responsibilities, it is not
easy to rapidly develop a consensus on complex
legal and technical issues. However, the
composition of the Commission of nine independent
and experienced citizens is also the most
effective means of assuring diverse political
input to Commission decisions and the best way to
assure political acceptance of compacts.
C. Prognosis
The Montana Legislature has now extended the
Commission until 1993. Judging from the past,
some personnel changes can be expected on the
Commission. If the success of the program
continues and more compacts are concluded within
this time-frame, or sufficient progress toward
completion of agreements is made, the Legislature
may extend the program further.
In the past year, the Water Policy Committee of
the Legislature has contracted with the Denver law
firm of Saunders, Snyder, Ross & Dickson, for an
evaluation of the Montana adjudication system.
The report to the Water Policy Committee is due in
October of 1988. The Compact Commission is under
review as part of the adjudication. Jack Ross, a
partner in the firm, stated recently in a speech
to the Montana Water Development Association that
using the Compact Commission to arrive at
negotiated settlements of tribal water rights
"makes a whole lot more sense than anything (else)
that's been done in the west." (News article,
Great Falls Tribune, March 30, 1988.)
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Many of the most supportive individuals are those 
who have had direct involvement in the process. 
Larry Fasbender, the Director of the Montana 
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation 
and president of the Missouri Basin States 
Association, has been supportive of the 
Commission's negotiations. Mr. Fasbender and 
Attorney General Mike Greely both submitted 
testimony to the last session of the Montana 
Legislature supporting the extension of the 
Commission.
In addition, representatives of the Confederated 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes, the Assiniboine and Gros 
Ventre Tribes, the Chippewa Cree Tribes, the Crow 
Tribe, the Blackfeet, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs have testified 
before the Legislature in support of 
negotiations. Supporting testimony has also been 
given by representatives of the Sweetgrass County 
Conservation District, the Environmental 
Information Center and the Montana Water 
Development Association.
In conclusion, the future of the negotiations 
process in Montana will depend on the progress 
that is made in the next four years and the extent 
to which tribal governments, federal and state 
agencies, private entities, and the Montana 
Legislature remain convinced that the benefits of 
negotiations outweigh the costs of litigation of 
reserved water rights.
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